(Ineffectiveness of Interdiction Efforts According to US Military Southern Command) "Last year, we had to cancel more than 200 very effective engagement activities in numerous multilateral exercises. Because of asset shortfalls, we’re unable to get after 74 percent of suspected maritime drug trafficking. I simply sit and watch it go by. And, because of service cuts, I don’t expect to get any immediate relief, in terms of assets to work with in this region of the world.
(Effectiveness of Interdiction Spending) "In 2005, the federal government spent $2.6 billion to disrupt and deter the transport of illicit drugs into the United States. While international efforts to step up drug seizures may affect availability, price and consequences associated with a particular drug (i.e., cocaine or heroin), CASA was unable to find evidence that such strategies have an overall impact on reducing substance abuse and addiction or its costs to government."
(Heroin Trafficking and Seizures in the Americas, 2012) "According to the United States, in 2012, the availability of heroin continued to increase in that country, likely due to high levels of heroin production in Mexico and Mexican traffickers expanding into 'white heroin' markets.117 Some metropolitan areas in the United States experienced an increase in heroin overdose deaths. Apart from heroin originating in Latin America, heroin from South-West Asia may be reaching the North American market in larger quantities.
(Heroin Smuggling into the US) "The smuggling of heroin into and within the United States was dominated by Italian organized criminal groups after the Second World War. Those groups purchased heroin and had it transported into the United States via Turkey and France. Later, major Chinese groups, known as “triads”, brought heroin via the territory of present-day Hong Kong, China, until Latin American heroin started to be trafficked into the United States in the mid-1990s, mainly by Colombian and Mexican groups.
(Cocaine Smuggling to the US) "The smuggling of cocaine into the United States was dominated by two Colombian drug cartels, the Medellin and Cali cartels, until the early 1990s. Those organizations controlled the entire supply chain. They proved to be the last of their kind, though, as they were dismantled by the mid-1990s. A large number of smaller Colombian cartelitos (small cartels) then emerged and changed the operation of the supply chain by selling cocaine to Mexican groups, as well as to customers in the emerging cocaine markets in Europe.
(Interdiction Funding Request from US President's FY2017 Drug Control Budget)
(US Customs and Border Protection Agency) "CBP is actually the largest law enforcement organization in the United States, comprised of 20,000 Border Patrol agents deployed between the ports of entry and over 20,000 CBP officers actually stationed at the various land, air, and sea ports of entry throughout our country. They are joined by an 1,000-agent force of air and marine interdiction agents, whose job it is to implement the air and maritime responsibilities of CBP.
"Since the late 1990s, the US policy has linked its counternarcotics policy with counterterrorism policy in Afghanistan. However, there is modest proof of a direct involvement by Al Qaida in the international drug trafficking network. The 9-11 Commission found little evidence to confirm this accusation. Groups known to be involved in the illicit drug economy were rather the Sunni Hizb-i Islami group of Gulbuddin Hekmatyar and the Taliban.
(Reliance on Interdiction Backfires) "One flaw of current U.S.-Mexico strategy is the false presumption that international trafficking of drugs, guns, and cash can be effectively addressed through interdiction, particularly along the nearly two thousand- mile U.S.-Mexico border. After a three-decade effort to beef up security, the border is more heavily fortified than at any point since the U.S.-Mexico war of 1846–48.
(Drug Detection Dogs) "The overwhelming number of incorrect alerts [by drug and/or explosive detection dogs] identified across conditions confirms that handler beliefs affect performance. Further, the directed pattern of alerts in conditions containing a marker compared with the pattern of alerts in the condition with unmarked decoy scent suggests that human influence on handler beliefs affects alerts to a greater degree than dog influence on handler beliefs."