United States
(The Merida Initiative - Mexico) "[The Department of] State generally lacks outcome-based measures that define success in the short term and the long term, making it difficult to determine effectiveness and leaving unclear when the Initiative’s goals will be met. Establishing better performance measures could provide Congress and other stakeholders with valuable information on outcomes, enabling them to make more informed decisions on whether or not policies and approaches might need to be revised and in what ways. Regarding program implementation, there are no timelines for future deliveries of some equipment and training, particularly for a range of capacity building programs that will take on a large role going forward. Provision of time frames for the commencement and completion of programs would set expectations for stakeholders, including the Mexican government, which has expressed concerns about the pace of delivery."
Source:Government Accountability Office, "The Merida Initiative: The United States Has Provided Counternarcotics and Anticrime Support but Needs Better Performance Measures" (Washington, DC: US Government Accountability Office, July 2010) GAO-10-837, p. 36.
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d10837.pdf"56. To ignore these minimum requirements, as well as the object and purpose of IHL [international humanitarian law], would be to undermine IHL safeguards against the use of violence against groups that are not the equivalent of an organized armed group capable of being a party to a conflict – whether because it lacks organization, the ability to engage in armed attacks, or because it does not have a connection or belligerent nexus to actual hostilities. It is also salutary to recognize that whatever rules the US seeks to invoke or apply to al Qaeda and any “affiliates” could be invoked by other States to apply to other non-state armed groups. To expand the notion of non-international armed conflict to groups that are essentially drug cartels, criminal gangs or other groups that should be dealt with under the law enforcement framework would be to do deep damage to the IHL and human rights frameworks."
Source:Alston, Philip, "Report of the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions, Philip Alston," United Nations Human Rights Council (Geneva, Switzerland: Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, May 28, 2010), pp. 18-19.
http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/hrcouncil/docs/14session/A.HRC.14.2...(2009) "As part of the military expansion, the administration has assigned U.S. troops a lead role in trying to stop the flow of illicit drug profits that are bankrolling the Taliban and fueling the corruption that undermines the Afghan Government. Tens of millions of drug dollars are helping the Taliban and other insurgent groups buy arms, build deadlier roadside bombs and pay fighters. The emerging consensus among senior military and civilian officials from the United States, Britain, Canada and other countries operating in Afghanistan is that the broad new counter-insurgency mission is tied inextricably with the new counter-narcotics strategy. Simply put, they believe the Taliban cannot be defeated and good government cannot be established without cutting off the money generated by Afghanistan’s opium industry, which supplies more than 90 percent of the world’s heroin and generates an estimated $3 billion a year in profits."
Source:Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, "Afhganistan's Narco War: Breaking the Link Between Drug Traffickers and Insurgents," (Washington, DC: 111th Congress, 1st Session, August 10, 2009), p.
http://www.fas.org/irp/congress/2009_rpt/afghan.pdf"Electoral politics was the reason why the preponderance of federal fiscal dollars resourced supply programs higher rather than demand reduction programs. The United States drug policy has been driven by the need to appear tough on drugs, regardless of results. Cocaine and heroin cost are declining and product purity is rising. Presidential leadership has a value, however, pressures to compromise may mitigate effectiveness. Political activism by an informed electorate to help shape the direction of public policy is needed."
Source:Major Barrett K. Peavie, United States Army, "United States War on Drugs: Addicted to a Political Strategy of No End," School of Advanced Military Studies, United States Command and General Staff (College of Fort Leavenworth, KS: January 2001), p. 46.
http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA391171&Location=U2&doc=GetTRD..."According to the National Review, when [General Barry] McCaffery retired from the military in 1996 to become Director, Office of the National Drug Control Policy, ONDCP, he was the youngest and most decorated four-star general in the Army. His appointment helped the administration’s new commitment to the get-tough approach.80 'The appointment was widely seen as a direct response to Republican election –year criticisms that the president was soft on drugs.'"
Source:Major Barrett K. Peavie, United States Army, "United States War on Drugs: Addicted to a Political Strategy of No End," School of Advanced Military Studies, United States Command and General Staff (College of Fort Leavenworth, KS: January 2001), p. 28.
http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA391171&Location=U2&doc=GetTRD..."There was no political or scientific-medical consensus for the policy designs that developed into national programs in the 1990s. Studies failed to address the political dimension of the drug control policy."
Source:Major Barrett K. Peavie, United States Army, "United States War on Drugs: Addicted to a Political Strategy of No End," School of Advanced Military Studies, United States Command and General Staff (College of Fort Leavenworth, KS: January 2001), p. 45.
http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA391171&Location=U2&doc=GetTRD..."The election year of 1996 marked the highest percentage of federal funds allocated to drug enforcement during the decade. The Clinton administration appointed former SOUTHCOM CINC, Gen (Ret) Barry McCaffery to the office of Director, National Drug Control Policy. Following the mandate of the President and Congress, the Cabinet level office maintained the 70/30 ratios between supply and demand reduction programs with the exception of 1999 and 2000. Programs that represented a traditional supply control approach included Presidential decertifications of Colombia, followed by the support of Plan Colombia."
Source:Major Barrett K. Peavie, United States Army, "United States War on Drugs: Addicted to a Political Strategy of No End," School of Advanced Military Studies, United States Command and General Staff (College of Fort Leavenworth, KS: January 2001), p. 46.
http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA391171&Location=U2&doc=GetTRD..."... the importance of having ‘hard’ numbers is greatly exaggerated because most uses are political and biased in nature and because most users do not have a formal model in which to apply the data. Furthermore, given the role of illicit drugs as a catalyst that accelerate social processes already in progress, the influence of illegal drugs on society do depend on the size of the illegal industry but also on the structure, institutions and values of the society and on the history of past drug income, anti-drug policies and the changes in institutions and values that had occurred. Thus, in a country like Colombia, the illegal drugs’ industry is today smaller than twenty years ago but its role in Colombian society today is a lot more negative than in previous decades.
Finally, the moral of the story is just that it would be nice to have accurate data on the illegal drugs industry, but it would be a lot nicer if the data are used with scientific rigor, acknowledging their limitations and avoiding political biases."
Source:Francisco E. Thoumi, "Let’s All Guess the Size of the Illegal Drugs Industry!" Transnational Institute (Amsterdam, The Netherlands: December 2003), p. 14.
http://www.tni.org//archives/crime-docs/numbers.pdf"Since the definition of homicide is similar in most countries, absolute comparisons of rates are possible. For the period 1999 to 2001, the average rate (the number of homicides per 100,000 population) was 1.6 in the EU with the highest rates in Finland (2.9), Northern Ireland (2.7) and Scotland (2.2). For the other countries, the highest rates were found in Russia (22.1), Estonia (10.6), Lithuania (10.6) and the USA (5.6)."
Source:Barclay, Gordon & Cynthia Tavares, "International Comparisons of Criminal Justice Statistics 2001," Home Office Bulletin 12/03 (London, England, UK: Home Office Research, Development, and Statistics Directorate, October 24, 2003), p. 3.
http://proxychi.baremetal.com/csdp.org/research/hosb1203.pdf"Fueled by Progressive Era faith in government supervised moral reform and growing prohibitionist sentiment, the movement reached critical mass in 1906, when the U.S., British, and Chinese governments came to a consensus on the need to control the opium traffic. This would culminate in international conferences in Shanghai (1909) and the Hague (1912), where the groundwork for international drug prohibition would be laid.
The year 1906 also saw the passage of the first federal drug legislation, the Pure Food and Drugs Act. Essentially a truth-in-labeling law, the Pure Food and Drugs Act was the first federal law to mention cannabis indica, including it with alcohol, opiates, cocaine, and chloral hydrate on a list of intoxicating ingredients whose presence was required to be noted on the label."
Source:Geiringer, Dale, "Origins of Cannabis Prohibition in California" originally published as "The Forgotten Origins of Cannabis Prohibition in California," Contemporary Drug Problems, (Summer 1999 - substantially revised June 2006) Vol 26, #2, p. 15.
http://www.canorml.org/background/caloriginsmjproh.pdf"The National Drug Control Strategy proposes a ten-year conceptual framework to reduce illegal drug use and availability 50 percent by the year 2007."
Source:Office of National Drug Control Policy, "Reducing Drug Abuse in America: An Overview of Demand Reduction Initiatives", Chapter II (Washington, DC: Executive Office of the President, January 1999), from the web at http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/drugabuse/2a.html last accessed Oct. 4, 2000."The FY 2009 resources of $1.3 million will support the National Alliance for Model State Drug Laws to prepare and conduct state model law summits and assist state officials in the promotion and adoption of summit-based laws. In addition, resources will support the development and distribution of updated model laws, as well as analyses of state laws and bills involving drug issues."
Source:Office of National Drug Control Policy, "National Drug Control Strategy: FY2010 Budget Summary," (Washington, DC: 2009), p. 138.
http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/publications/policy/10budget/ondcp.p..."Two-Year Goals: A 10 percent reduction in current use of illegal drugs by 8th, 10th, and 12th graders."
"A 10 percent reduction in current use of illegal drugs by adults age 18 and older."
"Five-Year Goals: A 25 percent reduction in current use of illegal drugs by 8th, 10th, and 12th graders."
"A 25 percent reduction in current use of illegal drugs by adults age 18 and older."
"Note: Progress toward youth goals is measured from the baseline established by the 2001 Monitoring the Future survey. Progress toward adult goals is measured from the baseline of the 2002 National Household Survey on Drug Use and Health. All Strategy goals seek to reduce current use of any illicit drug. Use of alcohol and tobacco products, although illegal for youths, is not captured by 'any illicit drug.'"
Source:Office of National Drug Control Policy, "National Drug Control Strategy" (Washington, DC: Executive Office of the President, Feb. 2005), p. 4.
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